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Reduced inequality in human capital may reduce appropriation
from the rich. They may therefore favor policies such as income
transfers and mandatory schooling which equalize human capital.
Comparing several such policies, we find that mandatory
schooling leads to higher incomes for both the rich and the poor,
and increases the welfare of all. Moreover, it is the optimal policy
for the rich, even when they fully pay for the education.












Education is often subject to government intervention, with public provision,
subsidization, and compulsory attendance. Indeed, education is one of the few
goods whose consumption government mandates. Moreover, though the poor
may be the main direct bene…ciaries of public education, it is often the rich
elite who promoted mass education and, in particular, supported compulsory
education. This suggests that the rich may bene…t from public education for
the poor, sometimes more than the poor do.
This paper analyzes one externality from education which may induce the
rich to encourage education for the poor—education may reduce appropriative
activity. As the literature recognizes (see, for example, Grossman, 1994, 1995,
Bertocchi and Spagat, 2000), the threat of appropriation may induce the rich
to favor redistribution to the poor. Here we compare three policies that may
reduce appropriation: income transfers, compulsory schooling, and education
subsidies. We …nd that if the endowments di¤er su¢ciently, the rich will oppose
income transfers and oppose subsidies to education. But they may favor com-
pulsory schooling (even when they fully …nance it), with the aim of reducing
appropriation. Even when the rich can reduce appropriation by spending on the
protection of private property (through the police force, security alarms, etc.),
they may still support compulsory schooling.
This preference for compulsory schooling may explain historical episodes
where this policy preceded other redistributive policies. In Prussia, for example,
schooling was made compulsory in the early nineteenth century, with full funding
by the landed nobility, and by the mid-century it was e¤ectively imposed.1 In
contrast, the Bismarckian social legislation was introduced much later, towards
the end of the century.
2 Literature
Our analysis of education resembles the analysis of land reform (as in Grossman,
1994), and of wage equalization (as in Grossman, 1995). Bertocchi and Spagat,
2000, study how income equalizing transfers can co-opt some of the poor thus
avoiding insurgency. Grossman and Kim, 1999, examine the same e¤ect of ed-
ucation we do, showing how equalizing educational spending across individuals
may reduce future redistribution.
The empirical connection between education and crime is studied by several
authors. Ehrlich, 1975, …nds that education (and a more equal distribution
of income) reduce property crimes. Donohue and Siegelman, 1998, …nd that
preschool enrichment programs (coupled with family intervention) reduce crime.
Grogger, 1998, notes that crime rates typically increase with age until the late
teens, and then decline. The relation is consistent with the hypothesis that the
opportunity cost of crime is wages, that wages rise steeply with age in the early
part of a career, and that education increases wages. Witte, 1997, in surveying
1See Good and Teller, 1969, for a history of public education in Germany.
3the empirical work, concludes that neither years of schooling completed nor
receipt of a high school degree signi…cantly a¤ects a person’s level of criminal
activity. But a person is less likely to commit a crime if he is at work or at
school rather than free from the supervision involved in those activities.
The literature on endogenous growth focuses on how increased aggregate
human capital enhances productivity; Eckstein and Zilcha, 1994, study the
consequent bene…ts of mandatory schooling. Our analysis complements and
reinforces the analysis of Bourguignon and Verdier, 2000. They show how the
current majority may want to increase the number of educated voters in the
future, despite their eventual loss of political power. We …nd the same e¤ect for
non-political reasons. Moreover, whereas Bourguignon and Verdier’s result is
consistent with the rich favoring subsides to high-school education over subsidies
to elementary education, our model makes sharper predictions, consistent with
the historical experience that elementary education was compelled or subsidized
before high school education was. And unlike political models, our model does
not predict that the poor would object to education by the rich.
A frequently used alternative explanation for mandatory policies relies on
moral hazard and time inconsistency. Speci…c applications of these ideas to
mandatory education as a second-best policy are provided in Boadway et al.,
1996, and in Konrad, 2001. Another explanation has to do with socializing
aspects of education as studied by Lott, 1990, and Usher, 1997. The externality
of schooling can be interpreted as inculcating common norms, and compulsory
schooling, according to this literature, increases social cohesion.
Thus, the e¤ect of education on crime can be modeled in at least three
ways. First, education may change the preferences of people. Second, time
at school or at work may substitute for time at crime. Compulsory education
or subsidies to education can then reduce crime, and perhaps do that more
cheaply than subsidies to work. Third, education may increase a person’s wage,
thereby inducing him after the completion of education to engage in production
rather than in crime. For simplicity, we shall model the last e¤ect, though
a model which focuses on the allocation of time between education and crime
would lead to similar results. The main di¤erence between our paper and earlier
contributions in this regard is that we compare several alternative policies to
reduce inequality, speci…cally showing when compulsory schooling dominates.
3 Assumptions
Consider an economy populated by two households, indexed by i. The poor
household (p) has a small initial endowment; the rich household (r) has a large
endowment. Each household consists of a father and a son. Fathers live in
period 1; sons live in period 2. In period 1 each father allocates his endowment
(or exogenously set income) between private consumption and spending on ed-
ucation. In period 2 each son either works or steals. Productive work increases
total output in the economy; theft redistributes income.
The gross income of individual i in generation t;t = 1;2 is yit; his con-
4sumption is cit. Let a father’s private spending on his son’s education (we say
private spending, leaving open the possibility that taxes are imposed to …nance
education) be ei. Then father i’s budget constraint is
yi1 = ci1 + ei: (1)
Son i uses a fraction xi of his time in theft, and a fraction 1¡xi in production.
Lending and borrowing are infeasible. Education increases productivity at work,
but not at appropriation.2
Interpreting ei as the productivity parameter and assuming for simplicity
the “Ak” technology, earned income is
yi2 = ei(1 ¡ xi): (2)
Theft expropriates income from the other person according to the production
function bxi, where 0 < b < 1.3 The share of income appropriated by individ-
ual i is therefore bxiyj2 for i 6= j. Thus, son i’s total income, and hence his
consumption, is
ci2 = yi2(1 ¡ bxj) + bxiyj2: (3)
Each parent’s utility increases with his own consumption and with the an-
ticipated consumption of his child:
U(ci1;ci2): (4)
The utility function satis…es the standard assumptions, with both its argu-
ments normal goods.
When schooling is voluntary, parents simultaneously allocate their budgets,
anticipating the time allocation decisions of the sons. Alternatively, the rich
parent may …rst set educational policy. For instance, under compulsory school-
ing the rich parent can set the level of mandatory schooling level, which he
…nances. Or he can transfer income to the poor parent to induce that parent
to spend more on education. Or else the rich parent can subsidize spending on
education by the poor parent. The rich parent chooses which policy to apply
and at what level. Thereafter the two parents make their decisions as before.
4 Voluntary schooling
Consider …rst education with no governmental interference. The analysis pro-
ceeds backwards, starting with a son’s decision whether to steal. Each son
maximizes ci2 = yi2(1 ¡ bxj) + bxiyj2 subject to yi2 = ei(1 ¡ xi). Linearity of
2Alternatively, we could assume that education also increases productivity at appropria-
tion, but at a smaller rate.
3For simplicity we disregard here the possibility of protecting oneself against the threat of
appropriation; see, however, Grossman and Kim, 1999, for the analysis of this possibility.
5consumption in period 2 in time spent on theft implies that the optimum has
corner solutions. In particular, the …rst-order condition is
¡ei(1 ¡ bxj) + bej(1 ¡ xj) < 0 and xi = 0 (5)
or
¡ei(1 ¡ bxj) + bej(1 ¡ xj) > 0 and xi = 1: (6)
Similar equations hold for j.
Analysis of equations (5) and (6) shows that xi = xj = 1 cannot simul-
taneously hold; instead, at least one person works. This leaves the following
possibilities:
xi = xj = 0 if ¡ ei + bej < 0 and ¡ ej + bei < 0; (7)
xi = 0;xj = 1 if ¡ ei + bej > 0 and ¡ ej + bei > 0; (8)
xi = 1;xj = 0 if ¡ ei + bej > 0 and ¡ ej + bei > 0; (9)
Consider the …rst period, where each parent chooses educational spending to
maximize his utility, U(ci1;ci2). Clearly, a parent who expects his son to steal
(or expects xi = 1) spends nothing on education, so that ei = 0. Consider an
equilibrium where exactly one son engages in appropriation. The utility of the
parent of an uneducated son is
U(yi;be¤
j): (10)





j maximizes U(yj ¡ ej;(1 ¡ b)ej). But incentive compatibility ensures
that the equilibrium is unique, with only the rich parent spending on educa-
tion, expecting his son to work. The poor parent spends nothing on education,
expecting that his son will engage in appropriation. Speci…cally, we have
e¤
p = 0;x¤
p = 1; and e¤
r > 0;x¤
r = 0: (12)







6Aggregate income in period 2 is then e¤
r.
Note that the equilibrium is ine¢cient: a transfer from the rich to the poor
parent conditional on an appropriation ban would make bothe parents better
o¤.




i = 0; for i = p;r (15)
where
e¤¤
i = argmax U(yi ¡ ei;ei): (16)
To recall the notation, think of ¤ as showing one child going to school, and
of ¤¤ as showing two children going to school. An even stronger solution, which
we will indicate by ¤¤¤, has compulsory schooling.




Total income in period 2 is then e¤¤
p + e¤¤
r , and the allocation is e¢cient.
We shall assume that a smaller marginal product of education cannot result
in more spending on education by the rich parent. This implies that, when no
appropriation is expected, spending on education, e¤¤
r , is at least as high as
spending on education„ e¤





This assumption guarantees that the equilibrium with both children attending
school results in a higher next-period income than the previous equilibrium,
where the poor parent spends nothing on education.
The solution with the poor son getting no education constitutes an equilib-
rium if it results in a higher utility than when the poor father educates his son
who then works:
U(yp;be¤
r) > U(yp ¡ e¤¤
p ;e¤¤
p ): (19)
The inequality holds for a su¢ciently large di¤erence in income: the poor parent
then prefers not educating his son, anticipating that his son will appropriate
from the rich son. The inequalities U(yp;be¤
r) > U(yp ¡ e¤¤
p ;e¤¤
p ) and e¤¤
r ¸ e¤
r






p ), then U(yp;be¤¤
r ) > U(yp¡e¤¤
p ;e¤¤
p ),
ruling out the equilibrium where the poor son works.
To summarize,
4In turn, this assumption is satis…ed when the elasticity of the marginal utility from son’s
consumption is small.
7Proposition 1 If the endowments of the rich and of the poor parents little
di¤er, then both parents educate their sons, and their sons work. If the endow-
ments di¤er su¢ciently, so that U(yp;be¤
r) > U(yp ¡ e¤¤
p ;e¤¤
p ), then a unique
equilibrium exists with the rich parent educating his son and expecting his son
to work, and with the son of the poor parent engaging solely in appropriation;
the resulting incomes in the following period are then relatively small and the
equilibrium is ine¢cient.
The Proposition implies that high inequality of endowments leads to ap-
propriation, which reduces growth and induces welfare losses. That solution is
consistent with the observation of Adam Smith that “the a-uence of the rich
excites the indignation of the poor, who are often both driven by want and
prompted by envy, to invade his possessions” (Smith, 1937, p. 670; quoted from
Ehrlich, 1975). For our later analysis, we shall assume henceforth that (19) is
satis…ed, so that when schooling is voluntary, the equilibrium has appropriation
and low educational spending.
5 Educational policies
This section studies di¤erent educational policies which aim to reduce appro-
priation. We examine them from the point of view of the rich parent, thus
implicitly assuming that he controls policy.
5.1 Compulsory schooling
Suppose that the rich parent can require the poor son to attend school, which the
rich …nances.5 Let the level of compulsory schooling be C; that is also spending
by the rich parent on educating the poor son. The rich parent determines C.
The poor father can supplement compulsory schooling with his own spending
on education. After that, in period 2, the sons decide whether to work.
Let the the poor parent buy additional schooling of zp. Clearly, the rich
will …nance compulsory schooling only if it eliminates appropriation. This, in
turn, happens if the utility of the poor parent who educates his son exceeds the
parent’s utility if his son is uneducated and so will appropriate from the son of
the rich. Since the optimal value of C for the rich parent is the smallest value
that satis…es this, we obtain the characterization:
zp = argmax U(yp ¡ zp;C + zp) (20)
and
e¤¤¤
r = argmax U(yr ¡ C ¡ er;er): (21)
5When schooling is compulsory but not subsidized, the rich parent clearly gains; but this
case is uninteresting.
8Denote by H(y;q) the demand by a parent for his son’s education when the
parent’s endowment is y and the price of education is q. We then have
zp = maxf0;H(yp + C;1) ¡ Cg (22)
and
e¤¤¤
r = H(yr ¡ C;1): (23)
Note that when the endowment of the poor parent is su¢ciently smaller
than the rich parent’s, the equilibrium with compulsory schooling has the poor
parent choose education just equal to the compulsory level, so that zp = 0 and
C = be¤¤¤




U(yr ¡ C ¡ e¤¤¤
r ;e¤¤¤
r ): (25)
We now compare the utility of rich parents under voluntary schooling to
utility under compulsory schooling. The utility under voluntary schooling is
U(yr ¡ er
¤;(1 ¡ b)e¤
r) = U(yr ¡ c¤
r2=(1 ¡ b);c¤
r2); (26)
Since spending by the rich on compulsory schooling is C = be¤¤¤
r , a rich parent’s
utility under compulsory schooling is
U(yr ¡ (1 + b)e¤¤¤
r ;e¤¤¤
r ) = U(yr ¡ (1 + b)c¤¤¤
r2 ;c¤¤¤
r2 ): (27)
Since b < 1, it follows that 1=(1¡b) > 1+b, implying that the price of a child’s
consumption is higher under voluntary schooling than when schooling is compul-
sory. But then it follows that U(yr ¡c¤
r2=(1¡b);c¤
r2) < U(yr ¡(1+b)c¤¤¤
r2 ;c¤¤¤
r2 ),
so that compulsory schooling yields higher utility for the rich father. And for
the same reason the rich father’s consumption is also greater under compulsory
schooling. If, in contrast to the assumption made above, the endowments di¤er
little, so that the poor parent chooses to supplement compulsory schooling, then
that level of schooling is even smaller than be¤¤¤
r , implying a fortiori that com-
pulsory schooling bene…ts the rich parent. And recalling that the poor parent
is not made worse o¤, we conclude that compulsory schooling increases welfare.
To summarize,
Proposition 2 Compulsory schooling for the poor increases the rich parent’s
utility, even if the rich parent pays for the schooling. Since the poor parent
is as well o¤ with compulsory schooling as without it, compulsory schooling is
e¢cient.
This result echoes a related one in Gradstein, 2000, who focuses on voting,
whereas we consider violent appropriation. The intuition behind the proposi-
tion lies with commitment e¤ects: compulsory schooling ensures that future
appropriation is reduced, thereby increasing the income of a rich son.6
6A Cobb-Douglas example used to explicitly compare the e¤ects of voluntary and compul-
sory schooling is available upon request.
95.2 Income transfers
Suppose next that the rich parent, instead of compelling schooling, transfers
income to the poor parent. That is, …rst, the rich sets the transfer, T. Then
parents choose education for their sons. Lastly, the sons allocate their time
between work and appropriation. Clearly, any such transfer will only be made
if it induces educational choices that reduce appropriation by the sons. Also, the
rich parent will choose the smallest transfer that meets this criterion. Hence,
any positive transfer, T, satis…es the conditions
U(yp + T ¡ ep;ep) = U(yp + T;ber) (28)
ep = H(yp + T;1); (29)
and
er = H(yr ¡ T;1): (30)
The rich parent gains from making a transfer only if
U(yr ¡ T ¡ er;er) > U(yr ¡ e¤
r;(1 ¡ b)e¤
r): (31)
Di¤erentiating U(yp + T ¡ ep;ep) = U(yp + T;ber) shows that dT=dyp < 0,
so that the higher the endowment of the poor parent, the smaller is the transfer.
This implies that when the endowment of the poor parent is su¢ciently high,
U(yr¡T ¡er;er) < U(yr¡e¤
r;(1¡b)e¤), and the rich parent makes no transfer.
Proposition 3 When the poor parent’s endowment is su¢ciently low, the trans-
fer required to make the poor son work is so high that no transfer is made. The
poor parent will therefore not educate his son, and his son will engage in appro-
priation.
Suppose now that the condition in Proposition 3 fails to hold, so that the
rich parent makes a transfer. Which of the two policies, compulsory schooling
or income transfer, does the rich parent prefer? The answer is not obvious, since
compulsory education is a more direct tool than a transfer, but requires the rich
to pay for all the mandated education; a transfer needs only induce the poor
parent to spend on education.
Suppose …rst that with the optimal compulsory schooling the poor parent
chooses to supplement education. Then (see the Appendix for proof) the rich
parent prefers compulsory schooling. The reason is as follows. Suppose that
T = C. Then the poor son’s consumption is the same under both policies. But
since a poor parent would not spend all of a transfer on education, the utility
of a poor parent would be higher under a transfer of C than under compulsory
schooling of the same amount. Since the rich parent chooses a policy which
guarantees that the poor is just indi¤erent between appropriating and working,
T must exceed C.
10Assume now that the poor parent prefers not to supplement education, so
that zp = 0 and therefore (from the condition U(yp+T¡ep;ep) = U(yp+T;ber))
that C = be¤¤¤
r . This happens when
¡U1(yp;be¤¤¤
r ) + U2(yp;be¤¤¤
r ) = 0: (32)
This equation holds when the endowments of the rich and of the poor greatly
di¤er. As proven in the Appendix, compulsory schooling then imposes a smaller
burden on the rich parent, who therefore prefers it to the income transfer.
To summarize,
Proposition 4 The rich parent prefers compulsory schooling over income trans-
fers to the poor.
The intuition here is that compulsory schooling is better targeted than trans-
fers to reduce future income inequality, and hence to reduce appropriation.
5.3 A stick and a carrot
Suppose now that the rich, in addition to mandatory schooling, can also protect
their property by spending on protection, for example on the police.7 Formally,
let d represent the amount of such spending by the rich parent. The fraction of
protected property is assumed to increase monotonically with this spending; in
other words, denoting by B(d) the unprotected fraction, B0 < 0. In addition,
B(0) = b, so that b is interpreted as the unprotected fraction of property in the
absence of any spending on protection. The issue we address here is whether
the rich parent would still want to mandate schooling.
To study this issue, suppose that the rich parent considers packages of poli-
cies to limit theft, where each package consists of di¤erent levels of mandatory
schooling and of property protection. The optimal package maximizes the rich
parent’s utility while making the poor son indi¤erent between engaging in ap-
propriation and working. Again, policy choices precede education and appro-
priation decisions. Thus, the rich parent solves the problem:
MaxC;dU(yr ¡ C ¡ d ¡ er;er) (33)
s.t. U(yp ¡ zp;C + zp) ¡ U(yp;B(d)er) = 0
anticipating the optimal education decisions.
To show that mandatory schooling can be optimal, consider Cobb-Douglas
preferences, U(ci1;ci2) = log(ci1)+log(ci2). We also con…ne attention to the case
where the poor parent supplements mandatory schooling. Calculation shows
that the optimal amount of education spending by the rich parent, given the
policy (C;d), is er = (yr ¡ C ¡ d)=2. The utility of the poor parent when
appropriation occurs is thus log(yp) + log(B(d)(yr ¡ C ¡ d)=2). If, in contrast,
7Incentive compatibility conditions ensure that only the poor will never engage in protect-
ing their property.
11no appropriation occurs, optimal supplementary schooling by the poor is zp =
(yp ¡ C)=2, resulting in utility 2log((yp + C)=2). Then (33) becomes
MaxC;d[2log((yr ¡ C ¡ d)=2)] (34)
s.t. 2log((yp + C)=2) ¡ [log(yp) + log(B(d)yr ¡ C ¡ d)=2)] = 0
The corresponding dual problem is
MinC;df2log((yp + C)=2) ¡ [log(yp) + log(B(d)(yr ¡ C ¡ d)=2)]g (35)
s.t. C + d = k;
where k is a constant. Di¤erentiating the objective function with respect to C
while respecting the constraint shows that if 2=yp + B0(d)=B(d) > 0 then C is
positive. This implies then that the rich impose mandatory schooling. Thus,
we obtain
Proposition 5 Spending only on protecting property may be suboptimal for the
rich. Some level of mandatory schooling—together with property protection—
could be optimal.
6 Conclusion
Inequality may induce some people to engage in appropriation instead of pro-
duction. Public policies which reduce inequality may therefore lead sons to
reallocate e¤ort from appropriation to production. Our comparison of several
such policies indicates that compulsory schooling leads to higher income for both
the rich and the poor; when inequality is high, income transfers and educational
subsidies do not. Furthermore, compulsory schooling, even when …nanced by
the rich, is the policy the rich would prefer.
These advantages of compulsory schooling policy may seem surprising, as it
constrains individual choice more than do other policies. In our model, however,
this constraint is a bene…t, since it reduces appropriation, and it does so at a
lower cost for the rich parent. This may explain why, historically, the rich elite
sometimes favored compulsory schooling.
7 Appendix
7.1 Comparing compulsory schooling to income transfers
Since both compulsory schooling and income transfers can eliminate appropri-
ation, the rich parent’s utility is either U(yr ¡ C ¡ er;er) under compulsory
schooling, or U(yr ¡T ¡er;er) under the income transfer. Hence, the compar-
ison from his viewpoint hinges on whether C > T.
Suppose …rst that the poor supplement compulsory schooling. Using our
usual notation, the poor parent’s indi¤erence condition, which determines C, is
U(yp + C ¡ H(yp + C;1);H(yp + C;1)) = U(yp;bH(yr ¡ C;1)): (36)
12Similarly, the indi¤erence condition which determines T is
U(yp + T ¡ H(yp + T;1);H(yp + T;1)) = U(yp + T;bH(yr ¡ T;1)): (37)
Di¤erentiation shows that the left-hand side in (36) increases with C and
that (37) increases with T. When T = C, the right hand side in (37) exceeds
that in (36), implying that T must exceed C.
When the poor parent does not supplement compulsory schooling,
C = H(yp + C;1); (38)
so that zp = 0, and
C = be¤¤¤
r = bH(yr ¡ C;1): (39)
This implies that
H(yp + C;1) = bH(yr ¡ C;1): (40)
In contrast, (37) implies that
H(yp + T;1) > bH(yr ¡ T;1): (41)
Together, the above two equations imply that T > C, thus proving the claim.
7.2 Education subsidies
Consider a subsidy by the rich for educational spending by the poor. Let the
subsidy per unit of spending be s; the total subsidy is sep. The sequence
of events is as follows. First, the rich parent determines s; then each parent
chooses how much to spend on his son’s education; lastly, the sons allocate
their time between work and appropriation. Once again, the comparison is not
obvious. Compulsory education directly sets education by the poor. But it is
costly to the rich, who must fully pay for the compulsory schooling. A subsidy
is an indirect way of inducing education, but need cover only part of the costs
of education.
Clearly, the rich favor a subsidy only if it induces su¢ciently high education
for the poor son so that he will engage in production. Under any subsidy, the
poor parent will educate his son only if the parent’s utility exceeds utility with
no such spending and with the son therefore engaging in appropriation.
Let spending on education chosen by the parents be ep and er, which satisfy
ep = H(yp;1¡s), er = H(yr¡sep;1), and ep > ber. These conditions determine
the minimal subsidy which ensures that the poor son prefers to work.
A poor parent who spends on education has utility
U(yp ¡ (1 ¡ s)ep;ep): (42)
The rich parent’s utility is
U(yr ¡ sep ¡ er;er): (43)
13The subsidy needed to ensure that the poor parent spends on education, so that
these utilitity levels are realized, is
U(yp ¡ (1 ¡ s)ep;ep) = U(yp;ber): (44)
Note in particular that this implies that the poor son’s consumption is strictly
higher when the son works: ep > ber. As with transfers, the rich parent subsi-
dizes education only if his utility is higher than when he makes no subsidy and
lets part of his son’s endowment be appropriated:
U(yr ¡ sep ¡ er;er) > U(yr ¡ e¤
r;(1 ¡ b)e¤
r): (45)
As before, it can be shown that when the poor parent’s endowment is su¢ciently
low, the subsidy which satis…es U(yp¡(1¡s)ep;ep) = U(yp;ber) is so high that
the rich parent prefers a zero subsidy. The following analysis therefore assumes




The question we now ask is whether the rich prefer compulsory schooling or
education subsidies. Letting S = sep, this question, in turn, amounts to asking
whether S > C.
To examine this issue, suppose that C = S, where the associated s satis…es
equation (44). Since under this assumption the transfer by the rich parent is the
same with a subsidy as with compulsory schooling, the right-hand sides in (36)
and (44) are equal. The left-hand side in (36), however, must be higher than in
(44). The reason is that a subsidy entails the substitution e¤ect in addition to
the income e¤ect, which is the only one present with compulsory schooling. It is
well known then that, with a given transfer, a person’s welfare is higher without
the substitution e¤ect. To maintain the equality in (36), C should therefore be
smaller than S.
We thus have proved
Proposition 6 A rich parent prefers to …nance fully a mandatory level of
schooling over subsidizing education spending by the poor.
Note that the rich parent may prefer compulsory schooling even though he
pays for all of it, in contrast to paying only some of the costs of educating
the poor with subsidies. Again, compulsory schooling dominates a subsidy to
education because it ensures that the poor son gets educated, instead of the
poor parent using some of the subsidy to increase his consumption.
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